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PROTECTING USERS OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
Margaret Ryznar* 
Social media platforms started as a fun way to connect with friends and family.  
Since then, they have become a science fiction nightmare due to their capacity to 
gather and misuse the data on their users.
1
 
For example, in early 2018, a whistleblower revealed that major election and 
referendum votes were influenced by “psychological warfare” on Facebook users 
through data obtained by Cambridge Analytica.
2
  A few years before this, Facebook 
admitted to running a psychological experiment on its users that may have altered 
their moods to see whether “emotional contagion” could be spread.3  Meanwhile, in 
2014, the free online dating website OkCupid acknowledged that it intentionally 
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  1 “One well-recognized threat” to privacy that arises from the conversion of our social 
interactions into data “is from the robust concentrations of electronic information aggregated into 
colossal databases.”  Woodrow Hartzog, Social Data, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 995, 995 (2013).  However, 
other issues arise from social media use.  For example, Facebook has led to many divorces because 
it alerts spouses to infidelity in addition to providing proof of it for court.  See, e.g., Shane Witnov, 
Investigating Facebook: The Ethics of Using Social Networking Websites in Legal Investigations, 
28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 31, 32 (2011) (noting that a majority of 
matrimonial lawyers have used evidence from social networks). 
 2 See, e.g., Carole Cadwalladr, “I Made Steve Bannon’s Psychological Warfare Tool”: Meet 
the Data War Whistleblower, GUARDIAN (Mar. 18, 2018), 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/data-war-whistleblower-christopher-wylie-
faceook-nix-bannon-trump.  A Cambridge University academic allegedly developed an app that 
pulled the Facebook data of fifty million people without their consent when their Facebook friend 
used the app.  Id.  Facebook acknowledged that it allowed the Cambridge researcher in cognitive 
and behavioral neuroscience to obtain the data with user permission, but the app did so without the 
consent of millions of users.  Id.  Then, a political intelligence firm built psychological profiles on 
people who would be targeted with certain messaging to influence them in, for example, the 2016 
U.S. presidential election and the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom.  Id.  “Research suggests that 
social media data and information about a user’s website choices can be used to determine a user’s 
personality.”  Stacy-Ann Elvy, Paying for Privacy and the Personal Data Economy, 117 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1369, 1403 (2017). 
 3 See Calli Schroeder, Note, Why Can’t We Be Friends? A Proposal for Universal Ethical 
Standards in Human Subject Research, 14 COLO. TECH. L.J. 409, 410–11 (2016). 
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made incompatible matches for research purposes.
4
  Even without such meddling, 
online dating can lead to lawsuits.
5
 
It is not irrational for social media providers to seek to capitalize on their data 
when they provide the platforms for free.
6
  Indeed, their business model is to sell 
data to third parties for marketing and other purposes.
7
  Yet, users should be able to 
expect that their data is not used to hurt them or is not sent to disreputable companies.  
Indeed, fewer people would use social media if the price were incurring a mood 
disorder or being manipulated to vote in a particular way.
8
 
While technology continues to push the boundaries of law as it evolves, 
effective legal protection has not evolved with it.
9
  As evidenced by recent events, 
the field of privacy has failed social media users.
10
  Meanwhile, the field of 
cybersecurity arose to address cybercrime, but many of the questionable uses of 
 
 4 James Grimmelmann, The Law and Ethics of Experiments on Social Media Users, 13 
COLO. TECH. L.J. 219, 223–24 (2015) (summarizing some of the experiments conducted on 
unknowing social media users). 
 5 See, e.g., Phyllis Coleman, Online Dating: When “Mr. (or Ms.) Right” Turns Out All 
Wrong, Sue the Service!, 36 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 139, 157–58 (2011). 
 6 Yet, social media companies do not correct misperceptions regarding this.  “Companies 
often summarize their data privacy policy as a series of services for the user’s benefit without 
making clear what value the company is getting from the consumer’s personal information.”  
Lauren Henry, Note, Institutionally Appropriate Approaches to Privacy: Striking a Balance 
Between Judicial and Administrative Enforcement of Privacy Law, 51 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 193, 194 
(2014). 
 7 See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, A Theory of Creepy: Technology, Privacy and Shifting 
Social Norms, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 59, 62–63 (2013); see also Katheryn A. Andresen, Marketing 
Through Social Networks: Business Considerations—From Brand to Privacy, 38 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 290, 293–94 (2011) (explaining the business model of social networking websites). 
 8 “I’d feel betrayed to find out that a company that purports to be a conduit to help me find 
others’ content turned out to be shaping my experience according to its political agenda.”  Jonathan 
Zittrain, Engineering an Election, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 335, 337 (2014). 
 9 “In 1986, Congress passed the Stored Communications Act (‘SCA’) to provide additional 
protections for individuals’ private communications content held in electronic storage by third 
parties. . . . Yet, because Congress crafted the SCA with language specific to the technology of 
1986, courts today have struggled to apply the SCA consistently with regard to similar private 
content sent using different technologies.”  Christopher J. Borchert et al., Reasonable Expectations 
of Privacy Settings: Social Media and the Stored Communications Act, 13 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 
36, 36 (2015). 
 10 Privacy as a concept is complicated, evading definitions and standards.  See Ira S. 
Rubinstein & Nathaniel Good, Privacy by Design: A Counterfactual Analysis of Google and 
Facebook Privacy Incidents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1333, 1333 (2013) (noting regulators’ 
reliance on “‘privacy by design’ as a critical element of their ongoing revision of current privacy 
laws. . . . But [Fair Information Practices] are not self-executing.”); Derek S. Witte, Bleeding Data 
in a Pool of Sharks: The Anathema of Privacy in a World of Digital Sharing and Electronic 
Discovery, 64 S.C. L. REV. 717, 723 (2013) (noting, for example, the FTC’s past decision to make 
social media companies have a privacy policy, but not imposing any content for that policy).  See 
generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2008). 
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social media data were legal.  The legality of these problematic actions has received 
criticism and prompted calls for change.
11
 
There are several choices lawmakers and policymakers have when it comes to 
the protection of social media data from exploitation by social media companies.  
Among these are fiduciary duties in corporate and trust law, as well as the duty of 
care in tort law.
12
  However, can these centuries-old legal frameworks grasp the risks 
and consequences of the improper use of big data generated by social media, or must 
they be tweaked?   
This Essay examines the benefits and drawbacks of fiduciary duties and the 
duty of care frameworks in the context of social media.  Any framework must hold 
data holders responsible for data breaches while fitting their business model. 
I.     FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
Fiduciary duties are a package of obligations imposed on those entrusted with 
the interests of others, often in regard to financial holdings in the fields of corporate 
law and trust law.
13
  The two main fiduciary duties are the duty of loyalty and the 
duty of care.
14
  The duty of care essentially requires the fiduciary to pursue the 
interests of the other party to the fiduciary relationship, whereas the duty of loyalty 
basically demands that the conduct of the fiduciary be free from conflict and self-
dealing.
15
  A fiduciary may also owe subsidiary duties, such as duties of good faith.
16
 
 
 11 “As technological innovation accelerates, so does the need to recalibrate individual 
expectations, social norms, and, ultimately, laws and regulations.”  Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 
7, at 73.  “Consumers, companies, and policymakers increasingly think about collection and control 
of personal information, and the media prominently highlights these issues.”  Nicole A. Ozer, 
Putting Online Privacy Above the Fold: Building a Social Movement and Creating Corporate 
Change, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 215, 215 (2012). 
 12 See Ari Ezra Waldman, Designing Without Privacy, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 659, 710 (2018).  
Other legislative choices include heightened Institutional Review Board (IRB) requirements when 
academic researchers are involved in particular or implementing a “right to be forgotten” like the 
European Union.  See, e.g., Michael L. Rustad & Sanna Kulevska, Reconceptualizing the Right to 
Be Forgotten to Enable Transatlantic Data Flow, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 349, 353 (2015); Lauren 
B. Solberg, Note, Data Mining on Facebook: A Free Space for Researchers or an IRB Nightmare?, 
2010 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 311, 312.  Another possibility is a citizen-suit provision in relevant 
legislation, coupled with a prohibition on mandatory binding arbitration.  This would help level the 
playing field between individual users and a massive, wealthy corporation that controls huge flows 
of information and valuable social networks.  Knowing that regular users can sue might also provide 
an incentive for social media companies to police themselves.  See Joshua A.T. Fairfield & 
Christoph Engel, Privacy as a Public Good, 65 DUKE L.J. 385, 385 (2015) (noting that people’s 
attitude toward their own privacy impacts others, making privacy a public good). 
 13 See generally ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 
588 (10th ed. 2017). 
 14 Andrew D. Appleby & Matthew D. Montaigne, Three’s Company: Stone v. Ritter and the 
Improper Characterization of Good Faith in the Fiduciary Duty “Triad,” 62 ARK. L. REV. 431, 
431 (2009). 
 15 See id. at 432. 
 16 See id. at 431. 
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Fiduciary duties have traditionally involved a financial relationship between 
the parties,
17
 but this does not prevent their application to social media companies.  
Users generate data, which is valuable because marketers routinely purchase it to 
better target their advertisements.
18
  Trust is a significant factor in people’s 
willingness to share personal information on online social networks.
19
  Thus, the 
fiduciary duty model may be applicable.
20
 
There are several reasons to apply a fiduciary duty framework to social media.  
Fiduciary duties have few exceptions, making them strong protectors of users.  
When engaged in self-dealing, for example, the fiduciary in trust law is subject to a 
no-further-inquiry principle—good faith and fairness to the beneficiaries are not a 
defense.
21
  This would also prevent social media companies from abrogating these 
duties in their contracts with users,
22
 thus barring Facebook from contractually 
requiring its users to weaken the company’s duties of loyalty and care.  This is 
important given the contractual nature of the relationship between users and social 
media companies.
23
 
One useful feature of this framework is its subset of subsidiary duties, such as 
the duty for social media platforms to do due diligence on companies buying or 
otherwise seeking the big data generated by social media users.
24
  For example, 
Facebook would have to explore the background of companies seeking its data with 
the intention of preventing the Cambridge Analytica scenario.
25
  Another relevant 
and important fiduciary duty is to delegate work with the data only to reasonable 
parties, carefully selecting, instructing, and monitoring them.
26
  Finally, the duty of 
prudence in trust law requires a degree of care, skill, and caution.
27
  These fiduciary 
 
 17 See id. at 440 (discussing the traditional context of a fiduciary duty arising between a 
shareholder and the director of that same corporation). 
 18 See Dennis D. Hirsch, The Law and Policy of Online Privacy: Regulation, Self-Regulation, 
or Co-Regulation?, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 439, 447 (2011) (noting that websites, network 
advertisers, data brokers, secondary users, and the government all use data on individuals). 
 19 Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Sharing, and Trust: The Facebook Study, 67 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 193, 193 (2016). 
 20 See Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Notice, and Design, 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 74, 122 
n.245 (2018) (“Many scholars, including Daniel Solove, Jack Balkin, Jonathan Zittrain, Danielle 
Citron, and others, have recommended a shift toward a fiduciary or trustee model to ensure 
corporations take consumer privacy seriously.  Notably, scholars suggested that changes to law on 
the books would be necessary before any such fiduciary relationship took hold.”).   
 21 SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 13, at 599.  
 22 See James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1179 (2009) (noting 
users will not negotiate enough privacy with the social media company in many circumstances). 
 23 See, e.g., In re Facebook Internet Tracking Litig., 263 F. Supp. 3d 836, 841 (N.D. Cal. 
2017). 
 24 As of 2017, there are over 455,000 Tweets per minute and three million posts shared per 
minute on Facebook—and these numbers are growing.  Jeff Schultz, How Much Data Is Created 
on the Internet Each Day?, MICRO FOCUS BLOG (Oct. 10, 2017), https://blog.microfocus.com/how-
much-data-is-created-on-the-internet-each-day/. 
 25 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 26 SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 13, at 658–60. 
 27 Specifically, a trustee shall invest and manage trust assets as a prudent investor would, by 
considering the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other circumstances of the 
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duties would slow the involvement of bad actors seeking big data from social media 
platforms. 
However, there are drawbacks to imposing fiduciary duties on social media 
structures.  Among these are the number of duties and the strictness of the standard, 
which may be ill fitted to impose on a voluntary, nonfinancial relationship.  For 
example, the conflict of interest that social media companies have with user data is 
practically inherent to their business model, possibly leading to the distortion of the 
fiduciary duty standard.  Fiduciary duties may simply be too inflexible for the social 
media context.  These concerns are less prevalent in the duty of care in tort law. 
II.     DUTY OF CARE 
The duty of care is a legal obligation that a party act toward another as a 
reasonable person in the circumstances would.
28
  In a tort case, if the actions do not 
meet the standard of care, then the actor may be liable for any injuries caused.
29
 
The duty of care between two parties depends on their relationship.  For 
example, product manufacturers have a duty to consumers to make safe products, 
property owners have a duty to visitors to protect them, and business directors have 
a duty to shareholders to make reasonable decisions in the best interests of the 
business.
30
   
However, courts have been hesitant to establish a duty of care owed by data 
aggregators to consumers who are not the customers.
31
  Indeed, “[w]hen consumers 
seek to enforce a breached duty of care claim, courts struggle to coherently establish 
when and between whom the duty existed.”32  Two recent cases reflect the courts’ 
hesitancy: 
In Willingham v. Global Payments, Inc., the court held that a payment processor 
owed no duty to consumers using the company’s platform to send funds to 
merchants.  Similarly, in In re Zappos.com, Inc., the court declined to treat a 
company statement about the security policy as an enforceable contract and also 
denied the existence of an implied contract to safeguard the data.
33
 
If the courts continue to find no duty of care in the social media context, 
legislators may decide to introduce a statute that imposes such a duty.
34
  For 
 
trust.  Id. at 624.  This can be translated to the social media context by requiring social media 
companies to manage user data with prudence. 
 28 See David W. Barnes & Rosemary McCool, Reasonable Care in Tort Law: The Duty to 
Take Corrective Precautions, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 357, 379 (1994). 
 29 See id. 
 30 See, e.g., id. at 386. 
 31 Matthew Hector, Do We Really Have No Place to Hide?, 24 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER 
& INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 57, 64 (2005) (reviewing ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO 
HIDE (2005)). 
 32  Merritt Baer & Chinmayi Sharma, Does Equifax Owe Victims a Duty of Care?, LAWFARE 
(Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/does-equifax-owe-victims-duty-care. 
 33 Id. 
 34 See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional 
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 805 (2004) (considering the role of courts 
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example, a duty of care has been codified in statutes like the Data Protection Act in 
the United Kingdom.
35
  Effective legislation must delineate what is encompassed in 
the duty of care because social media companies can exploit vague language.  
Congress can also assign a federal agency such as the Federal Communications 
Commission some responsibility for oversight and development of more detailed 
regulations, but clear statutory language is necessary to guard against regulatory 
capture. 
Applying the duty of care to the social media context accepts social media’s 
function to collect and profit on people’s data.  Social media users do not produce 
confidential information—they produce big data.  In contrast, for example, a lawyer 
representing a client must use reasonable care to avoid inadvertent disclosure of 
confidential information.
36
   
Thus, the duty of care can acknowledge the business model of firms in big data, 
while requiring that they vet the companies with which they interact.  It continues to 
incentivize Facebook and other social media companies to engage in exchanging 
free services with users for data, while limiting the possibility of data compromise.  
This would avoid giving user data to companies like Cambridge Analytica, but 
would not harm Facebook’s relationships with established businesses like Sephora.37  
While it is difficult to determine which actions would breach the duty of care, 
perhaps at least “novel, unexpected use of existing information” can be 
discouraged.
38
   
Given the social media model, it may be that the duty of care is more 
appropriate than fiduciary duties.  This would justify the application of the duty of 
care from tort law to the modern-day problem of data protection in social media.   
CONCLUSION 
The current framework for protecting users of social media does not work.  
Modern cybersecurity laws do not apply to the social media model of sharing or 
selling user data.  In contrast, both the centuries-old fiduciary duties and the duty of 
care in tort law offer ways to protect the data of social media.  They provide remedies 
to social media users by allowing them to sue the social media company that failed 
to uphold the duty owed, which would influence the way social media companies 
use their data and self-police.  The adaptability of ancient common-law doctrine to 
modern dilemmas could thus save social medial users a lot of grief, undue influence, 
and harm. 
 
 
versus legislatures in protecting threats to privacy by technology in the Fourth Amendment 
context). 
 35 Data Protection Act 1998, c. 29 (UK). 
 36 JOHN M. BURKOFF, CRIMINAL DEFENSE ETHICS: LAW AND LIABILITY § 5:9 (2d ed. 2018). 
 37 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 38 Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 7, at 68.  “Limited public awareness about these practices 
has contributed to a regulatory environment in which the aggregation and brokering of personal 
data has largely gone unchecked.”  Mary Madden et al., Privacy, Poverty, and Big Data: A Matrix 
of Vulnerabilities for Poor Americans, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 53, 65 (2017). 
